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I. INTRODUCTION
Today's antitrust law is characterized by stagnation and
indeterminacy. The failure is so thorough that it is not clear that United
States competition law actually leads to any outcomes that are defendable
except at the most superficial level.' Moreover, when enforcement does
result in a single desirable outcome, it is not clear that it is the best
outcome. The principal reason for this state of affairs is that antitrust
scholars 2 and courts cling to goals that are misguided and theories that
have not evolved despite an avalanche of information now available that
can modernize the discipline.
3
The current theories are, in effect, intellectual antiques. Adherence to
them skips over questions like: do people have different preferences for
different levels of competition? 4 Do they consistently prefer lower
prices? What does "better off' mean? Does "better off' have a temporal
component? 5 Are the preferences exhibited in the market ones that are
consistent with overall welfare? Indeed, antitrust law seems to have
exiled itself to an intellectual island where answers to the critical
questions that determine the success or failure of antitrust policy are
unwelcome. Conventional models maintain their grip by virtue of
assumptions that are unwarranted along with healthy doses of conscious
ignorance. 6
In order to understand this, first take the notion of efficiency. One
express goal of antitrust is to apply the laws in order to avoid a negative
impact on the most efficient firm in the industry.7 Finding that such a firm
1. In the United States the relevant ends are increasing consumer surplus, allocative
efficiency and productive efficiency. These will be discussed in depth in the pages that follow.
2. The list of "conventional" antitrust articles, books, and treatises would fill an entire law
review volume. Perhaps it is more useful to note that there are exceptions. See, e.g., ADI AYAL,
FAIRNESS IN ANTITRUST (2014); Rebecca Haw Allensworth, The Commensurability Myth in
Antitrust, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2016); Carl T. Bogus, New Road to Serfdom: The Curse of Bigness
and the Failure ofAntitrust, 49 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1 (2015); Thomas J. Horton, Fairness and
Antitrust Reconsidered: An Evolutionary Perspective, 44 McGEORGE L. REv. 823 (2013); Richard
S. Markovits, The Limits to Simplifying Antitrust: A Reply to Professor Easterbrook, 63 TEx. L.
REV. 41, 58-59 (1984); Maurice E. Stucke, Should Competition Policy Promote Happiness?, 81
FORD. L. REV. 2575 (2013).
3. See infra text accompanying notes 83-129.
4. Or, to put it more starkly, do they always want producers to push the prices of inputs
to the lowest possible level even if it means working conditions that consumers would find
morally unacceptable?
5. See infra text accompanying notes 26-27.
6. This may be expressed as: "It's an empirical question." I am not referring to merely the
usual assumptions about perfect information, many producers, ease of entry and exist which are
nearly always inaccurate but to the actually connections between competitive behavior and well-
being.
7. See Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 906-08 (9th Cir. 2008);
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has violated the antitrust laws is regarded as a false positive. 8 The current
view is that false positives are the worst possible outcomes.9 There are
three obvious problems with this blind adherence to an unnecessarily
narrow view of efficiency. First, when defining efficiency, only those
costs that are internalized by the firm count. The firm that is most adept
at not paying for the resources it uses may be the game-winner in
antitrust. This is inconsistent with efficiency as properly defined.
Second, in many instances, consumers exhibit a preference for goods
that are not produced at the lowest cost.10 For example, they may actually
have a higher preference for and be willing to pay more for products that
are produced by workers who labor under humane conditions. This can
mean higher costs of production and higher prices. Clearly, something is
going on other than consumers wanting the lowest prices. Moreover,
these preferences are and can be expressed in markets. Antitrust law, on
the other hand, with its emphasis on lower costs and prices, may impede
the market. What antitrust policy has missed is that, just as buyers have'
preferences for products, they have preferences for the types of markets
in which goods and services are produced. Highly competitive markets
may not be the most preferred.
Third, some markets exist to serve the vanity of buyers. The
attractiveness of a product can be a function of its ability to create envy
in others or to signal one's status. What makes these products desirable
and thus increases consumer welfare, is the price itself and, up to a point,
the higher the better. In effect, there are markets for price, and firms
compete not on the lowest price but on the role that price plays in
signaling the buyer's place in society. This is awkward for another
reason: how does the notion of efficiency accommodate those instances
in which a buyer's pleasure is measured in part by the extent to which it
makes others feel worse? A comprehensive and economically accurate
competition policy is not one that focuses solely only on the usual
externalities associated with production but also on the psychological
impact of goods purchased to diminish other people.
This Article has two main sections that necessarily overlap. The first
examines the three principal goals of antitrust-consumer surplus,
1
allocative efficiency, productive efficiency-and explains why they are
LePage's Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 177-78 (3d Cir. 2003); see generally Thomas A. Lambert,
Evaluating Bundled Discounts, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1688 (2005).
8. See Alan Devlin & Michael Jacobs, Antitrust Error, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 75, 76-
77 (2010).
9. Id. at 80.
10. See infra text at notes 83-113. Examples range from the market for "fair trade coffee"
and "Buy American" campaigns to numerous empirical studies discussed below.
11. For reasons noted below, this can be regarded as snap shot efficiency in that it captures
an instant in time.
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imperfect, incomplete, and indeterminate guides for policy. 12 The
purpose of this section is not to express a nihilistic view of antitrust but
to demonstrate that those who protect the status quo approach to antitrust
stand on a wobbly foundation, and also to suggest that if the current
rigidity in antitrust economics continues it will be at the expense of the
relevancy of the discipline. It includes, sometimes by implication,
proposals for improvement.
The second section continues that basic theme but considers two
specific areas in which growth is needed if antitrust is to remain relevant
in the next fifty years. They may or may not be addressed but, if they are
not, the legitimacy of antitrust economics and its application will surely
be called into question. The concluding section offers specific
recommendations for the modernization of antitrust.
Before beginning, I note two concerns that are not addressed here but
may seem to follow from the explanations. First, all that follows is itself
based on economics as a positive as opposed to normative discipline. For
example, some recent writings have considered whether antitrust should
be more mindful of "happiness" 13 and moral values of antitrust.14 To be
sure, one can adopt a normative perspective when it comes to antitrust.
Indeed, those who stick to the teachings of neoclassical economics do just
that if only by implication. 15 This Article strives to stay on the positive
side of things. What follows in the next part are economic-not morality
based-arguments that the current policy cannot maximize anything with
any level of confidence. The second part is slightly more normative in
that it suggests factors that ought to be examined before settling on the
direction antitrust is to take.
Second, in an article with these themes, discussion of the adoption by
antitrust scholars and judges of wealth maximization, or Kaldor-Hicks
efficiency, 16 as a measure of efficiency is unavoidable. That easy target
is not the subject of this Article. To many it may be the most alarming
element of antitrust policy and the application of economics to law more
generally. The criticisms are pervasive and convincing.17 It is a standard
12. The basic economics in this Part will be familiar to some readers but the analysis likely
will not be.
13. See Stucke, supra note 2, at 2578-80.
14. See Horton, supra note 2, at 833-34, 840-41, 863.
15. The clearest example of this is adoption of a Kaldor-Hicks standard for efficiency. See
infra text at notes 16-18.
16. Kaldor-Hicks efficiency or wealth maximization occurs when resources are allocated
to those who value them the most. Value here means actual monetary value not utility. See
THOMAS F. COTrER & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, LAW AND ECONOMiCS 51-52 (3d ed. 2013).
17. Although a mainstay of welfare economics for years, see Jeffrey L. Harrison,
Happiness, Efficiency, and the Promise of Decisional Equity: From Outcome to Process, 36 PEPP.
L. REV. 935, 942-44, (2009), the interest by legal academicians was likely spurred by Judge
Richard Posner's 1981 book, The Economics of Justice which amounted to a defense, on
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of efficiency that rests entirely in the capacity of market expressions or
their equivalents. When transferred to antitrust it appears under the label
of allocative efficiency-which roughly means inputs are drawn in to the
production of the most valued goods. The key word here is "valued,"
which in this context means only increased well-being that can be paid
for. Under these guidelines, if a firm purchases a chemical-say, as a
preservative for its high priced and popular brand of caviar-and by so
doing outbids a medical supply company that would have used the same
chemical to save the lives of the premature children of poverty level
mothers, the outcome would be allocatively efficient and wealth
maximizing. 18
II. THE ANTITRUST ECONOMICS HOUSE OF CARDS
The two most often discussed goals of antitrust are to maximize
consumer surplus and to encourage markets to move to allocatively
efficient levels of output. Less often-mentioned but perhaps as important
is to encourage productive efficiency. All of these goals may be advanced
by increased competition but, as has been illustrated, that is not always
true. 19 The situations in which they may not be simultaneously achieved
have been aptly described elsewhere and remain a problem for policy-
makers and scholars to grapple with.2 ° The problems addressed here go
deeper. They apply even if all three goals could be simultaneously
achieved.
A. Consumer Surplus
1. In General
The most tenuous goal is consumer surplus. Consumer surplus is the
difference between what a buyer pays for a good or service and the most
normative grounds, of the application of economic principles to law. Fairly devastating criticisms
followed. See Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV.
509, 518-20 (1980); Anthony T. Kronman, Wealth Maximization as a Normative Principle, 9 J.
LEG. STUD. 227, 237-39 (1980).
18. One's initial reaction to some of what follows may be that it applies only to consumer
products. Admittedly much of the discussion is about closing the gap between the meanings
attributed to market transactions and what is actually behind those signals. As the discussion
unfolds, however, it will quickly be clear that important portions of the discussion apply to all
transactions, and those that apply to consumer transactions may reflect strong preferences about
upstream transactions.
19. See Oliver E. Williamson, Economics as an Antitrust Defense, 58 AM ECON. REV. 18
(1968); ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 90-I 0(1978).
20. Williamson, supra note 19.
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he or she would have been willing to pay.2 1 Willingness to pay is
illustrated by the demand curve 22 for a specific good or service.
Consumer surplus is, in a sense, a type of psychological profit or, for
those familiar with contract law, the benefit of the bargain. Some of the
problems of focusing exclusively on consumer surplus are well known;
for example, it applies only to those who are well-funded enough to
engage in market transactions. 23 In fact, the idea that a huge public
investment in antitrust enforcement is made with the goal of benefitting
those who are well-funded enough to express their needs and preferences
in markets is itself a little worrisome. 24 Second, even the measure of
consumer surplus tells us very little about actual surplus. For example,
the price of a product may be ten dollars; two consumers may buy it and
would have been willing to pay fifteen dollars for the item. Have they
enjoyed equal consumer surplus? Yes. Can we say they are equally better
off? No. For one person, the savings of five dollars may mean being able
to buy something else that is desperately needed. For the other it may
mean very little. Maximizing consumer surplus means nothing more than
maximizing an artificial measure of welfare and thus, what has in fact
happened cannot be determined.
2. Decisional Demand and Actual Well-Being: Snapshot Efficiency
A major factor that separates consumer surplus from a defensible
competitive end is that consumer surplus is determined at the time of the
transaction. Obviously, the moment of the transaction is terribly
important to businesses; prices and quantities are determined and plans
for the future are formed. It is not as important to buyers who are
supposedly the beneficiaries of competition and antitrust.25 For example,
suppose Jack buys a new shirt for $50 and would have been willing to
pay $60. It is only at that instance that consumer surplus is measured. We
do not know how well-informed Jack is. He may suppose the shirt is
cotton and when unpacking it finds that it is linen. He may try it on in
front of his partner who tells him it's "just okay." These things have an
impact on Jack's actual welfare. Consumer surplus is akin to a snapshot
of someone in motion. That snapshot may be a function of whim, fear,
21. 1EBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS
PRACTICE 4 (4th ed. 2011).
22. Technically demand is a schedule of prices and the quantities buyers would be willing
and able to purchase at each price in a given market for a given time period.
23. This raises the issue of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency which will not be examined here.
24. This is not to suggest there is necessarily a socioeconomic bias. To the extent
competition drives prices down and encourages firms to be more efficient, prices should be lower
for even those whose budgets are devoted to essentials.
25. In fairness, there is one end that is served in that goods and services are allocated or
rationed. Of course, allocation could occur in many ways.
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lack of information, impulse, addiction, low self-esteem, and various
other temporary or permanent factors that are not related to the actual
utility the purchase will create. Without more the picture tells you nothing
about whether it will be a hard or soft landing, in water or on a rock.
Daniel Kahneman captures the problem succinctly: "utility is inferred
from observed choices and is in turn used to explain choices."26 And,
when the choices are made in markets, it only tells you that much about
those with the means to express their desires in the market. The only true
measure of substantive consumer surplus is determined sometime after
the transaction.
27
The key here is the difference between decisional utility and
experienced utility. Decisional utility is what consumer surplus is based
on; it is determined by anticipated outcomes. 28 Experienced utility is
what is actually felt or sensed by someone as a result of the decision.29 In
experimental studies, experienced utility can come in two forms. One is
an actual moment-to-moment assessment of utility.3° The other is based
on memories of an experience. 31 For example, if a person dines in a
restaurant, decisional utility is established when his or her order is given.
Moment-by-moment would be determined by asking at points during the
meal how happy the person is. Finally, remembered utility is assessed
after the meal is eaten and the subject is asked to rank the meal in terms
of level of satisfaction. 32 Another way to express this is that decisional
26. DANIEL KAHNEMAN, EXPERIENCED UTILITY AND OBJECTIVE HAPPINESS: A MOMENT-
BASED APPROACH, IN CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES 673 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky
eds., 2000). This notion mirrors Paul Samuelson's theory of "revealed preference" in which he
maintains that actual preferences are determined by choices people make. See, e.g., Paul
Samuelson, Consumption Theory in Terms of Revealed Preference, 15 ECONOMICA 243 (1948).
See generally Jeffrey L. Harrison, Egoism, Altruism, and Market Illusions: The Limits of Law and
Economics, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1309, 1316-20 (1986). See also Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen,
Choice and Revealed Preference, 21 So. ECON. REV. 119, 129 (1954).
27. A broader perspective is useful in understanding the limits of equating price to well-
being. What has been shown is that as real income has increased over the past 50 years, there is
little indication that the result is that people feel better off. Ben Cooper et al., Status Effects and
Negative Utility Growth, 111 ECON. J. 642, 642 (2001); Richard A. Easterlin, Will Raising the
Incomes ofAll Increase the Happiness ofAll?, 27 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 35, 37,44 (1995). The
link between this fact and antitrust may not be readily evident, but consider the fact that lower
prices-one of the aims of antitrust-has what is known as an income effect. See RICHARD A.
POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 34 (2d ed. 2001). In other words, as prices go down people are richer in
terms of their capacity to spend. If increases in real income do not increase a sense of well-being,
it is difficult to see how a public policy aimed at decreasing prices can be consistently depended
upon to have any predictable impact on actual well-being.
28. At the time of purchase, except for the possibility of experiencing pleasure from the
transaction, all the consumer depends upon is the anticipated outcome.
29. KAHNEMAN, supra note 26, at 673.
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. See Daniel Kahneman, Objective Happiness, in WELL-BEING: THE FOUNDATIONS OF
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utility or consumer surplus is based on hopes. Experienced utility or
actual utility is based on what happens on a moment-to-moment basis or
on the memories of what the subject now believes did happen. Kahneman
and others have demonstrated how experienced utility may be measured
in a variety of contexts. 33
The implication of these possibilities are illustrated in Figure 1. A
represents a conventional demand curve based on expected utility. 34 S is
the supply curve. The equilibrium price and quantity are P1 and QI,
respectively, and the area P1 CA represents consumer surplus. If markets,
with the aid of antitrust, work to achieve this equilibrium level, consumer
surplus is supposedly maximized. This is however, decision-based
consumer surplus which may or may not line up with actual utility. In
fact, there is no a priori reason to believe it does line up. Suppose
consumers actually experience, lower-than-expected utility levels. The
experience-based demand curve could be E1 .35 This would be demand if
it were based on the actual utility derived from the good or service. If the
price remained at P1, the highest possible consumer surplus would be
P I EB. An antitrust policy based on demand A overshoots the mark and
results in disutility for those purchasing units Q1-Q2. That loss is
measured by ECG. That is not the end of the bad news, however. Since
maximum consumer surplus is at Q2, the consumer disutility by
overshooting the mark must be subtracted from P1EB. Thus the
difference between experienced utility and utility based on expectations
is ABDFC.36
HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY 3, 4 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1999); Daniel Kahneman et al., A
Survey Method for Characterizing Daily Life Experience: The Day Reconstruction Method, 306
SCIENCE 1776, 1776-77 (2004).
33. KAHNEMAN, supra note 26, at 673; Daniel Kahneman et al., Back to Bentham?
Explorations of Experienced Utility, 112 Q.J. ECON. 375 (1997); For other approaches to the
problem of reconciling choices and welfare, see B. Douglas Bernheim & Antonio Rangel, Beyond
Revealed Preference: Choice-Theoretic Foundations for Behavioral Welfare Economics, 124 Q.J.
ECON. 51 (2009); Mark Fleurbaey & Erik Schokkaert, Behavioral Welfare Economics and
Redistribution, 5 AM. ECON. J.: MICROECONOMICS 180 (2013).
34. Demand shows the amount that would be purchased at each price in a given market at
a series of possible prices. It is, however, more meaningful to see demand as the most people
would pay for each possible quantity. Thus, as one moves left to right, the price will have to
decrease in order to achieve higher and higher sales levels.
35. Note that this refers to an actual market expression, not actual utility.
36. It should not be inferred from this that individuals who were able to predict their own
future subjective welfare in line with El or E2 would actually act in accordance with those
hypothetical demand curves; See Daniel J. Benjamin et al., What Do You Think Would Make You
Happier? What Do You Think You Would Choose?, 102 AM. ECON. REV. 2083, 2106-07 (2012);
See also Daniel Kahneman & Jason Riis, Living, and Thinking About It: Two Perspectives on
Life, in THE SCIENCE OF WELL-BEING 285 (Felicia A. Huppert et al. eds., 2007).
[Vol. 27
OTHER MARKETS, OTHER COSS MODERNZING ANTI77TRUST
Figure 1
Price, cost
K
A
B
S
P2
P\ F
E2
Quantity
Of course the opposite is possible as well. Consumers purchase at
levels associated with demand curve A but their experienced utility is
actually E2. One might look at the Figure and estimate the forgone
consumer surplus is equal to area CHI but this is not quite accurate. The
problem is that if demand were E2, a competitive market would establish
a higher price of P2 and a quantity of Q4. Actual maximum consumer
surplus would be P21K. Operating under the impression that demand is
A, antitrust policy will not and likely cannot be designed to react to
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experienced demand and to maximize the associated surplus. Q1 units
would be sold, which is less than the optimal quantity for this industry as
determined by experienced-based demand, and there would be a shortage
relative to the utility maximizing level of output
3 7
3. The Perfect Information Assumption
In effect, an antitrust policy centered around the demand exhibited in
markets is not one that can be connected to any particular welfare-
enhancing end.38 It is unlikely that anyone doubts this. Nevertheless, the
analysis so far might be criticized by arguing that theory of which I am
critical is based on the assumption of perfect information and that I have
violated that assumption.39 Or, in other words, we are somehow obligated
not to criticize a theory by noting the artificiality of its assumptions. 40
This is an odd response particularly because antitrust is hardly based on
the possibility of perfect information. In fact, it is because of the absence
of perfectly competitive conditions, including perfect information, that
antitrust exists at all. Moreover, think of what is actually being said: a
criticism is inappropriate if it questions one of the assumptions of the
model. It is important to remember that the assumption itself is another
means to an end. In this case it is to simplify the analysis; it has no other
importance. If the assumption means the model veers far from reality, the
model may be sound, but it fails at the application stage. 41 Nevertheless,
nothing so far violates the perfect information unless perfect information
means knowing things that are literally unknowable. Instead, the perfect
information standard is met by the fact that one knows he or she does not
know.
37. A shortage is the difference between the quantity demanded at a specified price and the
quantity supplied at that price. Of course, if the quantity supplied exceeds the quantity demanded,
it is a surplus.
38. Technically this would include even modified Kaldor-Hicks demand curve that
represented willingness to pay after ascertaining the utility derived from a purchase. As indicated
above, the theme of this article is not that Kaldor-Hicks is not welfare maximizing.
39. DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 57
(3d ed. 2000).
40. In this case, the assumption is that anticipated and actual outcomes are the same.
41. Those who resist questioning the assumption actually do what others do with respect
to competition and antitrust - they make means into ends. Any response that suggests that it is
unfair to dismiss an assumption at best means misunderstanding the function of the assumption
and, at worse, is anti-intellectual. In fact, it is hard to escape the conclusion that the perfect
information assumption has an ideological function; it is always as broad as it needs to be to create
the sense that the model has internal integrity. It is a means of sealing the theory off from reality,
even when it is obvious. From this standpoint it results in non-falsifiable outcomes and is not very
interesting.
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4. Can Markets Solve the Indeterminacy of Consumer Surplus?
A more interesting objection is that experienced and decisional
demand will draw closer together. For example, having experienced the
same restaurant, suit, and airplane flight, one's expectations are fully
informed and demands El and E2 in the Figure converge on demand
curve A. This may very well be true but many purchases are either one-
time only or infrequent. In these cases, very little learning takes place. In
addition, learning may take place at the same time that evaluative
standards and perceptive facilities evolve. If so, the possibilities of being
disappointed or pleasantly surprised may not decrease at all. In short,
even though A and El or E2 may converge in some instances, perhaps in
response to reading the ever-present internet evaluations of goods and
services, the extent to which this occurs is an empirical question and
certainly does not support a prediction that the market will solve the
expected vs. actual problem.
B. Allocative Efficiency
1. Generally, and its Dependency on Decisional Utility
Allocative efficiency occurs when resources are drawn into their most
valued uses. It maximizes the sum of consumer surplus and producers'
surplus.42 Simply put, producers, knowing the demand they face for their
output, go into markets and purchase inputs. They purchase these inputs
until the marginal cost of the inputs equals the price 43 for which the output
can be sold. In other words, as long as the perceived value of a unit of
output (as indicated by the demand curve) exceeds the costs of the
resources used in producing that output, it is efficient to produce that unit
of output. The market, like a giant vacuum cleaner, will pull resources
into those markets where the output is perceived as being of greater value.
This can be understood by once again referring to Figure 1. At each Q
for each demand curve, there is a corresponding P or price. The price for
each Q indicates the most people would be willing to pay for that quantity
to be purchased. As long as P exceeds the cost of production as indicated
on the supply curve, it is allocatively efficient to produce that level of
output. Thus, if A is the demand curve, the allocatively efficient level of
output is Q1.
Demand can be analogized to a stoplight that serves as a signal to
42. BORK, supra note 19, at 91-104; COTTER & HARRISON, supra note 16, at 43-44.
(Producers' surplus is the difference between what seller receives and the least the seller would
have been willing to take for what is sold).
43. When conditions are imperfectly competitive, production extends until marginal cost
is equal to marginal revenue.
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producers about how aggressively they should acquire inputs to bring into
each market. On the graph, for quantities to the left of Q1, the signal is
green-resources should be channeled into the production of that
product. On the right side, it is allocatively inefficient to produce a higher
quantity. It is a nice theory, but what the analysis of demand and
consumer surplus discussed above demonstrates is that the stop light
malfunctions whenever decisional demand differs from experienced
demand. On the graph, when experienced demand is to the right of
decisional demand, the light is red when it should be green. The opposite
occurs when the experienced demand is to the left of decisional demand.
2. Second Best Issues
44
Two other issues arise with respect to allocative efficiency that can be
viewed as separate from those arising from misleading demand signals.
The first problem is well-known to economists, but virtually ignored by
those specializing in antitrust economics. 45 Keep in mind that when a
private party or a government enforcement agency applies the antitrust
laws they focus on a single industry. In fact, distinguishing one market
from another is a critical part of virtually every antitrust case. 46 Ideally,
the result will be to bring the industry closer to conditions that would
exist in the context of perfect competition wherein prices would approach
costs of production and those costs would be the lowest possible in the
industry.
While that is the narrow goal in the context of single action, this is
hardly the equivalent of achieving allocative efficiency. In fact, making
one market more competitive may or may not advance the goal of
allocative efficiency at all. Consider an example involving substitute
products: apples and pears. Apple prices are $4 per pound and determined
by a price-fixing cartel. The cost of production is $3.50 and some inputs
are purchased in imperfectly competitive markets. Pears, on the other
hand, are sold under competitive conditions at a price of $3.75 per pound
which reflects the cost of inputs bought in perfectly competitive markets.
Now suppose a private party or a government agency decides to
enforce the antitrust laws against apple producers who are fixing prices.
The output market then becomes competitive and the price of apples
drops to the cost of production of $3.50. As a consequence, some people
44. Richard Markovits, Second-Best Theory and Law & Economics: An Introduction, 73
CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 3 (1998) (exploring the theory of second best) [hereinafter Markovits, Law &
Economics]; Richard Markovits, Second-Best Theory and the Standard Analysis of Monopoly
Rent Seeking: A Generalizable Critique, a "Sociological "Account, and Some Illustrative Stories,
78 IOWA L. REV. 327 (1993) [hereinafter Markovits, Monopoly Rent Seeking].
45. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 19, at 113-14.
46. HOVENKAMP, supra note 21, at 88.
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who were buying pears sold at allocatively efficient levels switch to
buying apples. In effect, the result of the enforcement has not resulted in
a better outcome. It has, in fact, switched buyers from markets in which
resources were drawn into production at allocatively efficient levels to a
market in which they are not. The better solution in terms of allocative
efficiency might have been to allow the cartel to continue operation.
Many readers will recognize this as a simple example of the theory of
second best.47 In effect, unless all markets can be made to behave
competitively, the second best solution may mean doing something
different altogether. In the context of antitrust, this may mean that any
action taken to increase allocative efficiency may in fact render markets,
on balance, less efficient. By consistently ignoring the interdependency
between so-called different markets, antitrust law, as currently applied,
fails to achieve allocative efficiency even if all the problems discussed
thus far did not exist. As economist Mark Blaug reminds us: "first best
optima are never actually observed in a second best world, it is not in'
general desirable to fulfill any of the first best optimum conditions; in
other words piecemeal welfare policies may be based on good or bad
qualitative judgments but they are not based on rigorous analytical
theorems. ' 48
A good example of enforcing the antitrust laws in a way that ignores
the theory of second best, and which may result in a worse outcome than
doing nothing, is bilateral monopoly. Assume, for example, that there is
one large seller of a product that is necessary to produce large crops of
tomatoes; in other words, a monopoly or a firm with a very high level of
market power. The impact of monopoly on price is well known. Prices
will be above-cost and competitive levels and output will be reduced.
Suppose in order to counteract this, farmers who buy from the monopolist
horizontally agree to pay only a certain price. This could easily bring
prices down closer to competitive levels and increase output. The
problem is that the farmers will be viewed as engaging in a horizontal
agreement in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.49 In effect, the
better solution is to allow the farmers to fix prices.
3. Allocative Efficiency and Externalities
Perhaps the most glaring misstep in current antitrust thinking is
ignoring externalities. In this context, externalities are costs of production
47. See Markovits, Law & Economics, supra note 44; Markovits, Monopoly Rent Seeking,
supra note 44.
48. MARC BLAUG, ECONOMIC THEORY IN RETROSPECT 594 (5th ed. 1996).
49. See generally Chris Bonti, O'Bannon v. National Collegiate Athletic Association and
the Current Status of Antitrust Jurisprudence Concerning Intercollegiate Athletics, 27 U. FLA.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 237 (2016).
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that are not absorbed by the firm engaged in the production of a good or
service. Any conclusions about allocative efficiency or productive
efficiency5 ° are incorrect if externalities are not fully accounted for. For
example, the typical polluting factory, using its accounting data, may
appear to be producing a unit of output for $20.00. On the other hand, if
smoke from its factory causes respiratory illnesses, damage to the
property of others, or the environment generally, the cost is actually in
excess of $20.00. The producer is consuming clean air or water and
creating a cost of production without internalizing it. For this reason
alone, the idea that increased competition and antitrust policy are means
to achieving allocative and productive efficiency crumbles. 51
Probably the most apt actual example involves the important Supreme
Court decision in Brooke Grp., Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp.52 Ultimately, the case called for the Court to assess when low
pricing could be the basis of a successful claim under the Robinson-
Patman Act, 53 or under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 54 that a party had
engaged in predatory pricing. The Court announced a two-part test for
predatory pricing. First, plaintiffs were required to demonstrate that
defendants were offering prices that were below the cost of production.55
Second, there must be a reasonable likelihood that the firm engaged in
predatory pricing will recoup the losses incurred during the period of
predation when it raises prices and when competitors exit the market.5 6
This formation can be defended only in the narrowest sense of
determining whether a defendant is engaged in an activity that appears
to have the goal of eliminating competitors. Beyond that superficial first
impression, the standard fails with respect to every other goal of antitrust
policy. Consider the goal of allocative efficiency. A firm that does not
internalize the full costs of production is not operating at an allocatively
efficient level. This can be visualized by returning to Figure 1 and
50. See infra text accompanying notes 58-63.
51. Perhaps the most obvious example of the externality problem is the production of
tobacco. The production of guns also arguably results in externalities. These externalities are
associated with offering the products. More common externalities as those associated with the
health of workers and degradation of the environment.
52. Brooke Grp., Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993).
53. Id. at 216-17. The Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) issue arose because the
allegation was that the defendant was selling the same product to different buyers for different
prices.
54. Under Section 2, "Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony,
and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $100,000,000 if a corporation,
or, if any other person, $1,000,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding 10 years, or by both said
punishments, in the discretion of the court." Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2015).
55. Brooke Grp., 509 U.S. at 222.
56. Id. at 224.
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examining the supply curve. The supply curve for individual firms is
reflected in the graph. The supply or cost curve that reflects actual
resources used will be above that curve and the allocatively efficient level
of output would be less than that depicted on the graph.
The whole matter becomes more troublesome if put in the context of
a lawsuit based on predatory pricing. Suppose Firm A produces cigarettes
for $.10 each and sells them for $.12 each. These are internalized costs
and the firm would not be regarded as engaged in predatory pricing. At
the same time suppose its production harms users of cigarettes or results
in air or water pollution that is equivalent to $.03 per cigarette. Across
the state line where environmental laws are stricter, a competing producer
internalizes all costs and offers cigarettes for $.13 each. Its level of
production is allocatively efficient but its lawsuit against its lower-pricing
competitor will fail. In fact, not only would it fail, but under current
antitrust standards, the first producer might well be regarded as more
efficient. The second producer can continue to lose business or relocate
to the state in which it can operate "more efficiently."57 In effect, there is
a distinction between what might be labeled "predation" and "social
predation." Antitrust law focuses on private predation, and this is only
loosely connected to allocative efficiency as properly defined.
One response to this is that including social costs in the determination
of costs for assessing predatory pricing runs the risk of false positives -
firms will be found to have violated the antitrust laws when they actually
have not. This is an awkward argument to make because it also means
that avoidance of so-called false positives is so important that predatory
pricing decisions are only valid if based on an incomplete accounting for
costs. In addition, ignoring externalities creates incentives that are
inconsistent with a great deal of tort, property, and environmental law
designed to encourage internalization and allocative efficiency. In short,
one way to avoid liability under a theory of predatory pricing is to
externalize as many costs as possible.
C. Productive Efficiency
1. Generally
In recent cases, courts and government agencies express concerns
about productive efficiency. 58 Productive efficiency is achieved when the
57. And externalize more of its production costs.
58. See Cascade Health Solutions v. Peace Health, 515 F.3d 883 (9th Cir. 2007). See also
POSNER, supra note 27, at 236; Daniel Crane, Mixed Bundling, Profit Sacrifice, and Consumer
Welfare, 55 EMORY L.J. 423 (2006); Daniel Crane, Multiproduct Discounting: The Myth of
Nonprice Predation, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 27 (2005); Lambert, supra note 7, at 1715; Barry
Nalebuff, Exclusionary Bundling, 50 ANTITRUST BULL. 321 (2005).
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resources drawn into the production of a good are employed to produce
the good at the lowest possible cost.5 9 This is ultimately a benefit to
consumers. If a firm uses fewer resources to produce given levels of
output, the supply of those inputs is higher to producers of other goods.
Input prices for those other goods decline and, ultimately, the price of
output will also fall. This chain of events occurs if antitrust law is
enforced in a way that protects the most efficient producers.
In some competitive industries, productive efficiency takes care of
itself. Firms will be motivated to lower costs of production in order to
charge lower prices and remain competitive. As will be explained in the
following Part, not allowing for externalities presents one problem.
Another problem is that the conditions necessary to assure productive
efficiency are rarely present.
The problem, as explained by Oliver Williamson in an important 1968
article, is that competition and productive efficiency may be at odds with
each other. For example, firms may have to produce at certain levels to
enjoy the economies of scale that are consistent with productive
efficiency. If the number of firms that can operate at this minimum
optimal size is small, it increases the chance that they will be able to
collude on price or exhibit the type of interdependent behavior that will
result in higher-than-competitive prices. 60 Each unit of output will be
produced at a lower cost, which means conserving resources, 6 ' but the
price paid may exceed competitive prices. In effect, the cost of productive
efficiency in one market is a decrease in consumer surplus.62
The quandary of productive efficiency has been addressed in two
contexts. First, as is obvious from the above example, is in the context of
mergers. The critical question is whether a merger that would reduce
competition should escape condemnation because of the impact it has on
productive efficiency. The Guidelines issued by the Justice Department
and the Federal Trade Commission 63 with respect to public merger policy
enforcement reveal a great deal of ambivalence toward an efficiency
defense for mergers.64 They state that the "[a]gencies are mindful that the
59. BORK, supra note 19, at 91 n.*; Howard A. Shelanski & J. Gregory Sidak, Antitrust
Divestiture in Network Industries, 68 U. CHm. L. REV. 1, 18 (2001).
60. See id.
61. As noted earlier, meaning lower costs of production and possibly lower prices in other
markets.
62. As with all quandaries, the problem can be viewed in two ways. For example, allowing
few producers in one market may increase productive efficiency in that market while lowering
consumer surplus. On the other hand, since resources are then released to be used in other markets,
there is no reason to think there will not be gains in consumer surplus in that market.
63. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 10
(2010) [hereinafter GUIDELINES], available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-
2010.pdf.
64. E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, UNDERSTANDING ANTITRUST AND ITS
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antitrust laws give competition, not internal operational efficiency,
primacy in protecting consumers.- 65 Thus, for the most part, the view
expressed is that efficiencies are most likely to be recognized when they
are likely to increase competition. For example, two firms who merge to
operate at a larger scale and lower costs may become more of a
competitive threat in an industry populated by a number of rivals. The
Guidelines fall well short of saying a merger that will lessen competition
may be permitted by showing the merger will mean lower costs of
production.
66
Recent cases have mirrored this reluctance to place too heavy a weight
on efficiencies. Efficiencies must be merger-specific. This means that the
merger is necessary to achieve them. They also must be verifiable and not
based on speculation. In United States v. H & R. Block, Inc. 6 7 the
argument was made that the merger of two tax preparation companies
would result in cost savings in ten different areas. The court recognized
that efficiencies could lead to greater competition but noted that the
efficiencies identified were not entirely merger-specific 68 and were based
on estimates that were not fully supported.69 In a more recent case,7° the
role of efficiencies was considered in the context of a merger of two
physician groups, one of which operated an emergency clinic. The merger
would lead to substantially higher levels of concentration in the industry
and the defendants offered an efficiencies defense based on
administrative costs. 71 The court noted, "[i]t is not enough to show that
the merger would allow St. Luke's to better serve patients. The Clayton
Act focuses on competition, and the claimed efficiencies therefore must
show that the prediction of anticompetitive effects from the prima facie
case is inaccurate." 72 In short, the court refused to allow productive
efficiencies to offset a negative impact on competition and, therefore,
consumer welfare. Instead, productive efficiencies had to promote
consumer welfare. The court even conceded that the efficiencies could
result in better service and were merger-specific. 73 Nevertheless it upheld
the finding that the merger violated Section 7 of the Clayton Act because
ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS 396-99 (6th ed. 2013); Daniel Crane, Rethinking Merger Efficiencies,
110 MICH. L. REV. 347 (2011) [hereinafter Crane, Rethinking Merger Efficiencies].
65. GUIDELINES, supra note 63, at 31.
66. Id at 30-31. See generally SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 64, at 396-99; Crane,
Rethinking Merger Efficiencies, supra note 64.
67. United States v. H & R Block, Inc., 833 F. Supp. 2d 36 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
68. Id. at 88-89.
69. Id. at 91-92.
70. Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke's Health Sys., Ltd., 778 F.3d 775
(9th Cir. 2015).
71. ld. at 790-92.
72. Id. at 791.
73. Id. at 791-93.
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the defendant was unable to connect higher efficiency to consumer
welfare.
Productive efficiency has also become an important part of the
analysis of bundling. 74 The practice of bundling is closely related to
predatory pricing and possible efforts to disguise it.7 5 As an example,
suppose Firm A sells a single product that is typically used in conjunction
with two others-to make it simple, suppose it is spoons. Firm B sells
knives, forks, and spoons. Firm A manufactures spoons for $10 and sells
them for $15. Firm B offers the complete set for $40. Or they can be
purchased separately for $15 each. If a buyer has a preference for A's
spoons, then to purchase a complete set would be $45. Someone who
wants a complete set is likely to buy from B. This will occur even if A
cuts its price to its cost of $10. Further, suppose B's cost to manufacture
spoons is $12. In short, from the point of view of productive efficiency,
A is the superior producer, but the ability of B to bundle the product that
it produces relatively inefficiently puts A at a disadvantage that excludes
it from the market. 76
2. Productive Efficiency and Externalities
Although productive efficiency is fairly viewed as third in line after
consumer surplus and allocative efficiency as an antitrust goal, it is
equally dealt with at only the most superficial level. As with allocative
efficiency, external costs play an important role in determining whether
a firm actually does operate efficiently or which of two competitors is
more efficient. This is perhaps not as important in the case of mergers
unless the efficiency in question is a product of one firm's adoption of an
approach to externalizing costs that the other firm was already
implementing.
The issue is likely to be more pronounced in the case of bundling
where the focus is on protecting the most efficient producer. In fact, an
accurate test for anticompetitive bundling is a difficult one for the courts
and anyone else to develop. At this point, various tests of whether
bundling should be viewed as an attempt to monopolize the commonly
74. See Cascade Health Solutions v. Peace Health, 515 F.3d 883 (9th Cir. 2007). See also
POSNER, supra note 27, at 236; Daniel Crane, Mixed Bundling, Profit Sacrifice, and Consumer
Welfare, 55 EMORY L.J. 423 (2006); Daniel Crane, Multiproduct Discounting: The Myth of
ANonprice Predation, 72 U. CHI. L. REv. 27 (2005); Lambert, supra note 7, at 1715; Nalebuff,
supra note 58, at 321.
75. The similarity is that a seller offers a product at below cost but since it is bundled with
a number of other products it is impossible to compare its price with its costs of production.
76. The bundling issue has led to controversy and disagreement among the courts.
Compare Cascade Health Solutions, 515 F.3d at 903, with LePage's, Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141,
154 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc).
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produced good have been formulated. 7 It is also a much discussed topic
among legal scholars.7" Yet, returning to the example above, the notion
that either Firm A or Firm B is more efficient in a meaningful sense,
solely on the basis of internalized costs, is beside the point. Instead, the
appropriate measure is which firm has the lowest costs when both
internalized and external costs are accounted for. Evidently, none of the
courts and scholars who purport to focus on productive efficiency or even
allocative efficiency are inclined to recognize this defect in the search for
antitrust solutions. In fact, their notion of "efficiency" may be a measure
of firms' capacity to externalize costs as much as any ingenuity with
respect to production.
D. Summing Up
This critical examination of antitrust goals is not offered to claim that
none of them should be regarded as relevant. Instead, it is designed
simply to illustrate, I think without dispute, what the foundational goals
of antitrust actually mean. Consumer surplus is a surrogate for well-being
but has only a coincidental relationship with actual well-being. Allocative
efficiency, as applied, may or may not advance the goal of efficient
resource allocation. Finally, the pursuit of productive efficiency can be,
and often is, inconsistent with the other goals. In fact, the convention of
ignoring externalities means that any references to allocative and
productive efficiency are deeply flawed. Clearly most contemporary
discussion of antitrust goals is exceedingly and artificially narrow. One
possible interpretation is that courts and legislatures have goals other than
employing antitrust optimally.
79
III. ADVANCES IN ANTITRUST THINKING
The analysis thus far has identified a number of shortcomings of
current antitrust policy that are easily identified; their implications with
respect to improvement are obvious. In addition, there are opportunities
for improvement that are not as obvious, but equally important. Much of
this information has come to light after the discipline was captured by the
current paradigm.
77. Compare Cascade Health Solutions, 515 F.3d at 903, with LePage 's, 324 F.3d at 154.
78. See generally POSNER, supra note 27, at 236; Daniel Crane, Mixed Bundling, Profit
Sacrifice, and Consumer Welfare, 55 EMORY L.J. 423 (2006); Daniel Crane, Multiproduct
Discounting: The Myth of Nonprice Predation, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 27 (2005); Lambert, supra note
7, at 1715; Nalebuff, supra note 58, at 321.
79. For example, as it currently exists it is very difficult for antitrust plaintiffs to prevail.
Those who favor the minimization of government involvement may find this a desired outcome.
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In beginning this portion of the analysis I want to quote one of the
leading experts in the field of antitrust law and, perhaps, antitrust
economics:
When Congress has not indicated otherwise, antitrust law should
use consumer behavior in the voluntary marketplace as its
principal source of policy. There, values are relatively clear:
consumers almost always want low prices, high quality, and
convenience of distribution. They may want and be willing to pay
for other things, but they almost always want these things. In cases
of doubt, it is a reasonable supposition that consumer welfare is
maximized by offering consumers the best quality at the lowest
price.80
This all seems simple enough and has a great deal of commonsense
appeal. Probably few would disagree. It seems like a reasonable starting
point for antitrust policy. The question today is whether this assumption
is so uniformly true that it must, in every instance, be the antitrust default
assumption. We do know that it simplifies consumer preferences far more
than necessary given what has been discovered in the past thirty-five
years. 81 Now we know enough about different markets to avoid the
necessity of a one-size-fits-all view of the relevant theories for antitrust.82
Indeed, based on the evidence, the statement might be more accurate if it
was that consumer welfare is maximized "by offering consumers the best
quality at a fair price" rather than the "lowest" price.83
80. Herbert Hovenkamp, Distributive Justice and the Antitrust Laws, 51 GEo. WASH. L.
REV. 1, 31 (1982).
81. See infra notes 82-113; see generally Albert 0. Hirschman, Against Parsimony: Three
Easy Ways of Complicating Some Categories of Economic Discourse, 37 BuLL. AMER. ACADEMY
ARTS& SCIS. 11 (1984).
82. Actually the general sense that market behavior is a simplistic and imprecise way to
determine preferences extends much further back than 35 years. In 1954 economist Nicholas
Georgescu-Roegen wrote: "While the theory of revealed preference has not yet fulfilled the claims
of its initiator, namely, to derive the preference structure from actual market data, it inspired
fruitful research which finally showed how little of the rationale of classical theory of choice is
reflected by the market behavior."
83. The sensitivity of consumers to fairness in pricing has be widely established, see Lisa
Bolton et al., Consumer Perceptions of Price (Un)Fairness, 29 J. CONSUMER RES. 474 (2003); see
Eric T. Anderson & Duncan I. Simester, Does Demand Fall When Consumers Perceive that
Prices are Unfair: The Case of Premium Pricing for Large Sizes, 27 MKTG. Sci. 492 (2008); see
Margaret C. Campbell, Perceptions of Price Unfairness: Antecedents and Consequences, 36 J.
MKTG. RES. 187 (1999); see Lan Xia et al., The Price is Unfair: A Conceptual Framework of
Price Fairness Perceptions, 68 J. MKTG. 1 (2004).
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A. Do Consumers Want to Pay the Lowest Price?
The starting point for assessing the desire for low prices is to recall
that consumer welfare is based on a Kaldor-Hicks. Thus, we know that
consumer welfare and actual well-being are only loosely connected.
Notions that "welfare" is linked to what occurs in markets can be
disproven simply by looking around at instances of untreated medical
problems, starvation, malnutrition, and a variety of other instances in
which massive amounts of potential utility are unaffected by markets. But
putting aside this issue, suppose consumers actually do not want the
lowest possible price. If this is the case, the assumption that consumers
want the lowest prices can result in false positives and false negatives that
may exceed an optimal level.84
As a general matter, the market is rich with instances in which the low
price appeal does not resonate with buyers. These include public
responses to minimum wage proposals, "pay what you want" marketing,
and the willingness of people to support sellers who have an express
social welfare goal.85 Moreover, the ideas of "best quality" and "lowest
price" are linked in a complex way. For example, "best quality" may, for
some, mean a product produced under humane conditions and, thus, not
at the lowest cost and price possible. Put differently, if lowest possible
prices are not uniformly desired it means that the underpinnings of
today's antitrust policy--consumer surplus, allocative efficiency, and
productive efficiency-are weakened and need to be refined in a way that
brings them in sync with current consumer preferences.
86
Perhaps the most telling evidence of this is what polls show about the
minimum wage. Uniformly, and for some time, a majority of Americans
have supported raising the minimum wage. 87 Although it is possible they
are unable to understand that this may mean raising the prices of goods
and services produced by minimum wage workers, this possibility is
likely a stretch even for those who are most cynical about the intelligence
of the American public.
84. As noted earlier, antitrust law is currently implemented to avoid false negatives at the
expense of false positives. There appears to be no empirical support for that policy.
85. These are all discussed in the following pages.
86. One of the most important articles that questioned on a comprehensive basis the
underpinnings of conventional economic thought is Amartya Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of
the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory, 6 PHIL & PUB. AFF. 317 (1977).
87. Bruce Drake, Polls Show Strong Support for Minimum Wage Hike, PEW RESEARCH
CENTER (Mar. 4, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/03/04/polls-show-strong-
support-for-minimum-wage-hike/; National Poll: Small Businesses Support Increase in
Minimum Wage, http://www.businessforafairminimumwage.org/news/00335/national-poll-sma
I-businesses-support-increasing-minimum-wage; Jeanne Sahadi, Strong Support for Raising the
Minimum Wage, CNN MONEY (June 9, 2014), http://money.cnn.com/2014/06/09/news/
economy/minimum-wage-poll/.
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On a less comprehensive basis, the "lowest" price assumption is
inconsistent with a number of other phenomena. For example, there has
been a recent increase in the use of "pay what you want" (PWYW) or
"name your own price" pricing policies. 88 If the "lowest price" rationale
is applicable, all of these efforts would result in a price of zero. Whether
these efforts are eventually profitable or not, the fact that revenue is
generated at all indicates that the lowest price rationale is incorrect and
that an antitrust policy burdened by this assumption may well be
misguided. For example, in one experiment, people riding a rollercoaster
at an amusement park were offered a photograph of themselves on the
ride with different pricing strategies. One was a fixed price, another
PWYW, and finally, PWYW was combined with a notice that half of
what was paid would be contributed to a specific charity. The final
strategy increased revenue and profit over a fixed price and a PWYW
strategy alone.89 Clearly, from an economic perspective, the riders
viewed themselves as buying a different product when buying under the
PWYW strategy, but the fact remains that they could have taken the
photograph and paid nothing. Additional studies also result in outcomes
that may surprise those who view customers as always wanting the lowest
possible price. In a far-ranging study involving buffet meals, movie
screens, and hot beverages, even though consumers could pay nothing,
they paid 86% of the normal retail price. 90 In the hot beverage
experiment, they actually paid over 10% more than the normal retail
price. 91
Social scientists have extended the analysis of PWYW to determine
what factors account for how much buyers are willing to pay.9 2 The
outcomes differ depending on the context of the study, but as a general
matter, perhaps surprisingly, the key is not altruism. Instead, the sense of
what is a fair price plays a significant role, as does the level of satisfaction
88. For discussions, see Ayelet Gneezy et al., Shared Social Responsibility: A Field
Experiment in Pay-What-You-Want Pricing and Charitable Giving, 329 SCIENCE 325 (2010); Ju-
Young Kim et al., Pay What You Want: A New Participating Price Mechanism, 73 J. MKTG. 44
(2009); Klaus M. Schmidt et al., Pay What You Want as a Marketing Strategy in Monopolistic
and Competitive Markets, 61 MGMT. SC1. 1217 (2015).
89. Gneezy et al., supra note 88, at 326. Importantly, there was no evidence that increased
spending on photographs reduced spending elsewhere in the amusement park. Id.
90. Kim et al, supra note 88, at 51. Even when the prices paid were lower it did not mean
the strategy lowered sales. The lower price increased sales and had a promotional quality. Id. at
53. PWYW has also been employed by museums, online music, and in the sales of software.
Schmidt et al., supra note 88, at 1217.
91. See Kim et al., supra note 88, at 51.
92. Schmidt et al. supra note 88, at 1222. It should be noted that resistance to serious
considerations of these new teachings may be confined to those interested primarily in antitrust
economics. In fact, the American Economic Review, the most prestigious economics journal and
one that is peer reviewed, routinely publishes articles about the fallibility of conventional
economic assumptions and the implications for understanding modem behavior.
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with whatever is purchased. 93
To some extent, none of these results should be surprising. In
numerous prior studies, the notion that individuals focus solely on
individual self-interest has been refuted.94 As discovered in the PWYW
experiments, people expect prices to be fair, not the lowest. Moreover,
this can extend to what a firm pays for its inputs. What this means can be
understood by reference to a 1986 study by Daniel Kahneman, Jack
Knetsch, and Richard Thaler.95 In a survey, they posed the following two
scenarios:
1. A small photocopying shop has one employee who has worked
in the shop for six months and earns $9 per hour. Business
continues to be satisfactory, but a factory in the area has closed and
unemployment has increased. Other small shops have now hired
reliable workers at $7 an hour to perform jobs similar to those done
by the photocopy shop employee. The owner of the photocopying
shop reduces the employee's wage to $7.96
2. A small photocopying shop has one employee . . . [as in
Question 1] . . . The current employee leaves, and the owner
decides to pay a replacement $7 an hour. 9 7
In response to the first, 83% of respondents viewed the decrease as
unfair.9 8 In the second question only 27% of respondents viewed the
change as unfair.99 If we assume that the wage difference would
eventually be reflected in pricing, it is clear that consumers do not want
the lowest price. On the other hand, competition and antitrust policy
operate under the opposite assumption. In fact, according to Kahneman,
93. See Xia et al., supra note 83, at 6; Bolton et al., supra note 83, at 478.
94. See, e.g., Robin Dawes & Richard Thaler, Anomalies: Cooperation, 2 J. ECON. PERSP.
187, 187 (1988); Werner Guth et al., An Experimental Analysis of Ultimatum Bargaining, 3 J.
ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 367, 384 (1982); Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew Spitzer, The Coase
Theorem: Some Experimental Tests, 25 J.L. ECON. 73, 93-96 (1982); Daniel Kahneman et al.,
Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics, 59 J. Bus. S285, S299 (1986) [hereinafter Kahneman
et al., Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics]; Daniel Kahneman et al., Fairness as a
Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 728, 729 (1968)
[hereinafter Kahneman et al., Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking]; Moses L. Pava et al.,
Fairness as a Constraint in the Real Estate Market, 19 J. Bus. ETHICS 91, 92, 97 (1999); Matthew
Rabin, Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 1281, 1281;
see generally ARTHUR OKUN, PRICES AND QUANTITIES: A MACROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 170 (1981).
95. See Kahneman et al., Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics, supra note 94, at
S299. See also, Raymond F. Gorman & James B. Kehr, Fairness as a Constraint on Profit
Seeking: A Comment, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 355, 355 (1992).
96. Kahneman et al., Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking, supra note 94, at 730.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
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Knetsch and Thaler, in some instances there is a "strong aversion to price
rationing."' 00
One's reaction to this may be to ask what difference it makes in the
context of antitrust policy with its emphasis on lowest cost producers.
That view might be expressed in terms of products having a functional
element and a fairness element. In terms of fair trade coffee the actual
product might be defined as the coffee and the conditions under which it
is produced. Or, in the experiment described above, the product is
"products made by employees who are treated fairly." As the experiment
illustrates, though, if one goes down the route of defining the product so
it encompasses working conditions, things get even more complicated.' 0 '
Buyers were not concerned if new employees were paid the lower
wage. 102 What is deemed as fair and, thus, the willingness to pay more
than the lowest price, is highly contextual. 103 If products were defined by
their functional element as well as by consumer preferences for the
treatment of workers, one could argue that antitrust's emphasis on
consumer surplus, allocative efficiency, and productive efficiency is
legitimate. This is likely impossible.
But this type of analysis misses a critical part of the competition-as-
means to higher consumer surplus formulation. What the studies cited
above and other events illustrate is that consumers have preferences for
different levels of competition. For example, people paying monopoly
prices might well prefer more competition to push prices lower but not at
the expense of low paid workers employed by the monopolist. 104
Conversely, buyers from a firm in a highly competitive industry may
actually prefer to buy from a firm less pressed to push input prices to the
lowest level possible. 0 5 Consequently, competition is a means to certain
ends, but those ends are not necessarily lowest prices.
This leads to a conclusion that may be difficult to grasp for
traditionalists, but it seems irrefutable that there is a separate and to date
unrecognized market at work here-the market for competition itself. In
some instances consumers will literally pay more to have less
competition, even if it means less allocative efficiency and productive
efficiency as traditionally defined. It is too much to expect antitrust law
to have a completely nuanced approach to consumer preferences about
the types of markets and the preferred levels of competition. On the other
hand, that does not legitimize the current state of affairs in which there is
100. Kahneman et al., Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking, supra note 94, at 735; see
also OKUN, supra note 94.
101. Kahneman et al., Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking, supra note 94, at 28-29.
102. Id. at 730.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 736.
105. Id. at 734.
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one simplistic view of what consumers prefer and the kinds of markets
that will deliver what is preferred. 10 6 It does not seem unreasonable for
enforcement officials to be cognizant of the impact of increased
competition on all aspects of a good from which buyers derive utility.
In fact, the current approach adds to the problem of antitrust
indeterminacy, especially with respect to the connectedness between
demand and supply. For example, under the accepted theory, the supply
curve is the same as the marginal cost curve of a firm. 107 What the studies
discussed above and widespread support of minimum wage hikes suggest
is that buyers actually have preferences for the level of the supply curve
(the costs incurred in production). 0 8 For example, they may be eager to
pay a few pennies more for goods made by American workers under the
theory that they are less likely to work under sweat shop conditions than
workers in foreign countries. 0 9 Or they may be willing to pay more
knowing workers are supplied with health care insurance." 0 In effect,
demand itself cannot be determined without reference to supply. ,l
"Lowest possible price," "most efficient producer," and "allocative
efficiency" do not capture what may be very important and valued by
buyers.
A supporter of the current paradigm will certainly argue these are
issues that a well-functioning market could handle with more
information. Consumers with a taste for fairness would respond to labels
like "Union made" or "Made in the USA." Indeed, all of the things
discussed here lead to marketing opportunities and the possibility of
market solutions. This seems unlikely. For example, most consumers will
not know how a producer goes about deciding what to pay for inputs or
even the implications of labels which themselves may be deliberately
misleading. In fact, there is little motivation for sellers to reveal all that
is relevant. Even worse, sellers will be motivated to portray goods as
produced under fair conditions and raise price accordingly but not
actually provide more humane working conditions. In addition, even
those wishing that firms act fairly may engage in freeriding in the sense
of hoping everyone else will avoid the single-minded profit seeker while
they themselves buy from the lowest price seller. This is not to say that
freeriding will always occur in these situations. In fact, studies indicate
that perceived unfairness is punished even when doing so is costly and
106. Id. at 736.
107. Id. at 739.
108. Kahneman et al., Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking, supra note 94, at 736;
Kaudhik Basu, A Theory of Association: Social Status, Prices and Markets, 41 OXFORD ECON.
PAPERS 653, 658 (1989) [hereinafter Basu, A Theory ofAssociation].
109. Kahneman et al., Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking, supra note 94, at 736.
110. Id.
I 11. Basu, A Theory of Association, supra note 108, at 665.
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when there is no assurance that others are committed.'" 2 For example, in
the Kahneman study, participants express a willingness to avoid stores
that were believed to treat employees unfairly."13
B. Selling Price and Signaling Markets
The superficiality of notions like consumer surplus, allocative
efficiency, and productive efficiency may be best illustrated by focusing
on price and the motivations for some purchases. Price is, of course, one
way scarce resources are allocated. 114 The problem is that while serving
its allocative function, price itself has other effects, some desired and
some not.1 15 These can be connected to the concepts of consumer surplus
and externalities. In the first case, a high price makes a good more
desirable and can increase consumer surplus. 1 16 In the second case, the
exclusionary effect of a high price can have a negative effect on others. 117
This means the focus of antitrust on the lowest price misses the welfare
effects of price itself.' 1
8
1. Price and Consumer Surplus
In some cases, price is not merely a rationing mechanism but also a
tool for signaling. For example, paying a high price that is likely to be
known to others can be a sign of status, at least to those who want to
impress others through conspicuous consumption.1 9 This is the idea of a
"Veblen good. '' 120 This phenomenon makes consumer surplus a complex
112. Kahneman et al., Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking, supra note 94, at 729.
113. ld. at736.
114. But not the only way. Rationing can be done by a host of means ranging from lottery
to how long someone is willing to wait in line. Kahneman et al., Fairness as a Constraint on
Profit Seeking, supra note 94, at 735.
115. Basu, A Theory of Association, supra note 108, at 653.
116. Barah Y. Orbach, Antitrust Vertical Myopia: The Allure of High Prices, 50 ARIZ. L.
REV. 261, 277-78 (2008) [hereinafter Orbach, Antitrust Vertical Myopia].
117. Id.at278.
118. Id. at274.
119. These are also referred to as "positional" goods because they denote a position in the
status ranking. See Robert H. Frank, The Demand for Unobservable and Other Nonpositional
Goods, 75 AM. EcON. REV. 10 1, 101 (1985); Norman J. Ireland, On Limiting the Market for Status
Signals, 53 J. PUB. ECON. 91, 91 (1994). For a different approach to this, see Orbach, Antitrust
Vertical Myopia, supra note 116, at 277. In addition, high prices may lower the value of an item.
For example, an auction of a Nobel Prize would render the prize worthless. Basu, A Theory of
Association, supra note 108, at, 653-54.
120. See THORSTE[N VEBLEN, THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS 33 (1899); Laurie Simon
Bagwell & B. Douglas Bernheim, Veblen Effects in a Theory of Conspicuous Consumption, 86
AM. ECON. REV. 349,349 (1996); Robert L. Basmann et al., A Note on Measuring Veblen's Theory
of Conspicuous Consumption, 70 REV. ECON. & STAT. 531, 531 (1988); Angela Chao & Juliet B.
Schor, Empirical Tests of Status Consumption: Evidence from Women's Cosmetics, 19 J. ECON.
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notion. We can still say that consumer surplus is equal to the difference
between the amount paid and the most one would be willing to pay. 121 in
fact, focusing on consumer surplus is like conducting a cost-benefit
analysis in which costs themselves are part of the benefit.
An illustration of the complexity of the interaction between price and
willingness to pay is that people are often willing to pay more if sales
people appear to reject their efforts to buy luxury goods. 122 In effect,
rejection in these instances means people are willing to pay more to gain
acceptance by virtue of actually purchasing the item. 123 An additional
twist to this willingness to pay more phenomenon is that the rejection
works "better" if the salesperson is seen to represent the product. The
notion of representation here refers to the dress and manner of the
salesperson. The seller of a Hermes purse is more effective at the
"rejection" game if the salesperson seems to be genuinely associated with
the brand and seems indifferent to whether the item is purchased or not.
To add to the complexity, the importance of price may differ
depending on gender. It is believed that men may often exhibit lavish
spending as a way of attracting mates, while studies show that women are
more likely motivated by a desire to protect existing relationships.
124
These results may not be consistent with the image we have or would like
to have of modem relationships in the United States but, in fact, the
subjects were Americans and the findings no more than three years old. 125
Expensive handbags, shoes, cars, and designer tee-shirts are evidently
viewed by some women as indicators of the devotion of their spouses and
PSYCHOL. 107, 109 (1998).
121. Jeffrey L. Harrison, Trademark Law and Status Signaling, 59 FLA. L. REV. 195 n.86
(2007). It may be logical to think the best Veblen goods are those that are generally regarded to
be scarce and high priced but for which a buyer secretly pays less. As long as no one knows of
the discount, the buyer may experience an extra element of consumer surplus. Of course the
Veblen effect has led to an entire industry of counterfeit goods which serve the purposes, if well
done, of achieving the extra consumer surplus. On the other hand, to the extent a thriving
counterfeit market exists, the Veblen effect of all sales of a product is discounted. Obviously
trademark law plays an important role in the ability to sell Veblen goods. See id at 199-202.
122. Morgan K. Ward & Darren W. Dahli, Should the Devil Sell Prada? Rejection Increases
Aspiring Consumers Desirefor the Brand, 41 J. CONSUMER RES. 590,604 (2014). See also Ranier
Romero-Canyas et al., Paying to Belong: When Does Rejection Trigger Ingratiation?, 99 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 802, 811 (2010). This not to say all conspicuous consumption
comes at a premium. In fact, a phenomenon also exists that might be identified as conspicuous
nonconformity. People may purposely dress in informal clothes in contexts in which conformity
might dictate business attire. It has been shown that this can be a source of status. See Silvia
Bellezza et al., The Red Sneakers Effect: Inferring Status and Competence from Signals of
Nonconformity, 41 J. CONSUMER RES. 35, 49 (2014).
123. Ward & Dahl, supra note 122, at 604.
124. See Yajin Wang & Vladas Griskevicius, Conspicuous Consumption, Relationships,
and Rivals: Women's Luxury Products as Signals to Other Women, 40 J. CONSUMER RES. 834,
847 (2014).
125. Id. at 838.
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that those spouses are "off limits" to others. 126 The relevant point is that
a lower price is not desirable because it actually makes the product less
"useful." Conversely, a higher price makes it more useful. Of course,
perhaps the best outcome would be to acquire the product at a low price
while everyone else has the impression that a higher price was paid. On
the other hand, this may not result in the same level of satisfaction
because buyers could not be confident that others were not receiving the
same discount.
Price may play quite a different role in some groups. Although I could
not locate studies on the matter, it seems clear from experience that
paying a lower price than others can also be a source of status. 127 Again,
it is not a matter of getting a low price or even that competition drives
prices to the lowest level. It is a matter of status to have successfully
bargained for a lower price than others. This may be viewed as a desire
to receive the lowest relative price as a measure of one's insight and
bargaining skills. A low competitive price determined by the market does
not advance this type of utility. Here, the status is a function of knowing
that one did not merely get a low price because the market is competitive
but because of individual skills. This also complicates the notion that
people want the lowest price. In a way they do, but only if others are not
enjoying the same low price.
2. Price-Related Externalities
The fact that markets exist for price itself may seem like a relatively
benign gap in antitrust economics, but with conspicuous consumption can
come envy 128 or even dislike of the person engaged in the "price market."
In this sense, just as a product made in a polluting factory creates an
external cost not reflected in the price paid, it is likely that status-
signaling goods also produce a cost to others. 129
More specifically, sociologists have distinguished between the impact
of benign envy and malicious envy. In the case of benign envy,
individuals may not buy an item, deeming it overpriced. When someone
else buys the item at that price, then the envious person finds the price
126. Id. at 839-40.
127. For a general discussion, see Kathleen D. Vohs et al., Feeling Duped: Emotional,
Motivational, and Cognitive Aspects of Being Exploited by Others, 11 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 127,
133 (2007).
128. A good workable definition of envy is "a negative attitude toward another person's
superiority and the desire to gain what this person possesses." Aaron Ben-Ze'ev, Envy and
Inequality, 89 J. PHIL. 551, 552 (1992).
129. See generally Niels van de Ven et al., The Envy Premium in Product Evaluation, J.
CONSUMER RES. 984, 990 (2011). For an empirical work on the power of envy, see Steven R.
Beckman et al., Envy, Malice and Pareto Efficiency: An Experimental Examination, 19 SOC.
CHOICE & WELFARE 439, 465 (2002).
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acceptable. One may try to fit this into the default idea that consumers
want the best products at the lowest price but, in fact, they are found to
be willing to pay an envy premium in order to eliminate their negative
feelings. Malicious envy has a slightly different effect that is equally
distorting in terms of what price connotes. In these instances, individuals
wish to reduce envy by reducing the perceived status of the purchases of
others. They signal their criticism of the envied purchase by buying an
alternative. In all cases, the amount paid is not for the product per se but
the result of an interpersonal comparison.
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS
I believe what is suggested here is a different way of looking at
antitrust. Typically, the focus is inward with the question being how to
explain phenomena so that they fit within, or can be explained by, the
conventional model. Instead, the stress here is on viewing competition
and antitrust law as mere tools. They are tools, however, that generate a
great deal of expense ranging from enforcement costs, compliance
efforts, massive expert witness costs, and the dangers of false positives
and false negatives. Yet, much of current scholarship seems to be aimed
at defending the tools or refining them so that the emphasis is less on
what produces the best outcome and more on what is the best outcome as
long as it does not disturb the traditional teachings.
To make this point in a different way, readers familiar with
economics, law, and even sociology understand the concept of regulatory
capture. 130 A regulated firm is ultimately controlled by those regulated.
Related to that is what might be called "paradigm capture." 131 In this case,
an entire discipline is controlled by one method of analysis. Antitrust law
for several years has been the subject of paradigm capture in the sense
that the resistance to new and old teachings that undermine the current
theoretical model are vigorously resisted. 132 In fact, the resistance is
sometimes based on the argument that there are no coherent alternatives.
That is hardly a defense of the status quo until the status quo is itself
coherent. It is not. In short, if the emperor has no clothes, it is not a valid
response to argue that others are also lightly clad. This Article aims to
reverse that by challenging readers to take a more critical perspective.
130. See George Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT.
SCI. 3, 3-4 (1971). See also Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, The Politics of Government
Decision-Making: A Theory of Regulatory Capture, 106 Q. J. ECON. 1089, 1118 (1991).
131. See generally Thomas Kuhn, The Structure ofScientific Revolution (1962 Revolutions),
in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF UNIFIED SCIENCE 111 (Otto Neurath ed., 1970).
132. See, e.g., Joshua D. Wright & Judd E. Stone, Misbehavioral Economics: The Case
Against Behavioral Economics, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 1517, 1517 (2012).
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The preceding pages provide a rich array of examples about how
markets deviate from neoclassical theory. 133 They put into play the
question of whether consumers want the best products at the lowest
prices. In reality, consumers are likely to want fair prices. Moreover, the
focus of conventional antitrust economics on decisional demand as
opposed to experienced demand creates indeterminacy with respect to
what terms like consumer surplus, allocative efficiency, and productive
efficiency actually mean. More disturbing on a practical level is the
question of why external costs are not considered relevant in the antitrust
analysis of the costs of production.
Why do antitrust economists, judges, and public enforcers cling to
these theories? To paraphrase an old Woody Allen joke, it can only be
because they need the eggs. 134 What they get out of it is an illusion of
certainty and the appearance of a theoretical basis for their political
leanings.
Like any law review article, this one is a failure unless it presents some
ideas about ways to improve the model or, at least, to find better
"eggs." 135 I will list some possibilities here, most of which will seem
unrealistic to conventionalists but may have appeal to those who would
like antitrust to incorporate information that has been ignored or was
unavailable when the theories that guide antitrust today were adopted.
A. The Narrow Definition of Costs
The narrow definition of costs in the context of antitrust means that
any discussion of efficiency defenses, minimum optimal size, most
efficient producer, allocative efficiency, productive efficiency, and
predatory pricing is highly suspect. One may take the view that other
areas of law are designed to ensure that firms internalize all costs of
production. For those that believe that as a matter of faith, little can be
said other than to note decreases in air and water quality and myriad other
examples of environmental and health degradation. Perhaps the most
succinct example is the notion that producers of tobacco prices do not
133. There are arguments that markets will eventually work through the issues presented
here. Any suggestion of that nature requires a host of assumptions that may not be accurate in the
short run or ever.
134. WOODY ALLEN & MARSHALL BRICKMAN, Annie Hall, in FOUR FILMS OF WOODY ALLEN
105 (1982) (the joke goes like this: "I-1 thought of that old joke, you know, this-this-this guy goes
to a psychiatrist and says, 'Doc, uh, my brother's crazy. He thinks he's a chicken.' And, uh, the
doctor says, 'Well, why don't you turn him in?' And the guy says, 'I would but I need the eggs.'
Well, I guess that's pretty much how I feel about relationships. You know they're totally irrational
and crazy and absurd and... but, uh, I guess we keep goin' through it because, uh, most of us
need the eggs.").
135. Jeffrey L. Harrison & Amy R. Mashburn, Citations, Justifications, and the Troubled
State of Legal Scholarship: An Empirical Study, 3 TEX. A&M L. REV. 45, 45 (2015).
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engage in predatory pricing as long as the extreme health hazards are not
accounted for. 136 This is a less difficult issue to address than it appears.
Any party to an action should be able to demonstrate that external costs
undercut any defenses based on claims of efficiency. In particular, in the
context of bundling, if the defendant claims to be the most efficient
producer, an externalities rebuttal should be available to plaintiffs. The
same would be the case when a firm defends a predatory pricing claim by
using internal accounting data. As a general matter, accounting data and
an economic analysis are different, and it is at best odd that economists
and courts rely on accounting data when offering opinions or making
decisions about costs.
B. The Realm of Externalities
More difficult in the realm of externalities is how to treat goods that
are purchased for the purposes of creating psychological externalities to
others. There can be little doubt that status-enhancing purchases, often
signaled by high prices, come at a cost to others. There is no antitrust
response to high prices set by a firm with market power. 137 To some
extent, this can be addressed by placing less emphasis on applying
trademark laws to protect the status-signaling of buyers. 
138
C. The Problem of Second Best
A problem noted here and discussed far more extensively in the work
of Richard Markovits 139 is the problem of second best. It is a difficult
topic. Nevertheless, difficulty does not excuse the myopia of enforcement
agencies and courts. The overemphasis of antitrust courts and
enforcement officials on single markets exacerbates the problem. One
reaction to this problem is to permit the presentation of an economic or
efficiency impact statement in which aparty against whom adverse action
will be taken is given an opportunity to identify the harmful impact to
other markets and the superiority of alternative remedies.
The idea of examining better solutions is hardly a new one in
antitrust. 140 In decades-old merger law, an issue arose concerning the
wording of the Clayton Act, 4' which prohibits mergers that may tend to
136. See supra text accompanying note 54.
137. Sherman Antitrust Act 15 U.S.C.A. § 2 (2004) (addressing monopolization which
requires the acquisition or maintenance of monopoly power through unfair means).
138. This is a matter that has been treated at length elsewhere. See Harrison, supra note 121.
139. See Markovits, Law & Economics, supra note 44; Markovits, Monopoly Rent Seeking,
supra note 44.
140. There examples or not exactly second best issue but illustrate examples in which courts
and enforcement agencies have been inclined to look further than the most obvious solutions.
141. 15 U.S.C. § 17 (2016).
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lessen competition. The key here is lessening competition. Suppose a firm
that is not currently producing in an industry is a target of a merger and
is actually the source of downward pressure on prices. 142 As a general
matter, the merger would lead to a decrease in competition, as firms
within the industry would have one less potential "competitor., 143
Suppose, however, even though the merger may not lessen competition,
competition would likely increase if the firm entered de novo. 144 In these
instances, the best solution might be to enjoin the merger, although if
narrowly viewed in terms of antitrust policy, there is no decline in
competition. 1
45
More recently, the possibility that antitrust allows courts and
enforcement agencies to settle for second-best solutions has heated up in
the context of Section 1 of the Sherman Act when firms have colluded
but claimed a product necessity defense. 146 This is consistent with a
number of cases involving the National Collegiate Athletic
Association, 147 in which member schools claim that horizontal collusion
is necessary to make college football a viable product. 148 The defendants
in these instances must demonstrate that their anticompetitive efforts
142. See generally HOVENKAMP, supra note 21, at 615-17; CARLTON& PERLOFF, supra note
39, at 627-29.
143. The theory is that the threat of entry will encourage lower pricing by incumbent firms.
144. This is sometimes referred to as the "Actual" Potential Entrant Doctrine. In effect, de
novo entry would increase in the number of competitors in the industry. For obvious reasons, the
theory is more compelling if the entry was not already seen as a potential competitor. See
HOVENKAMP, supra note 21, at 618-19.
145. The U.S. Supreme Court has addressed the theory on at least two occasions. See United
States v. Falstaff Brewing Co., 410 U.S. 526, 537-38 (1973); United States v. Marine
Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 625, 633 (1974). The Court did not adopt the theory but left
the question open. It appears to have been applied or treated as a viable theory by some lower
courts. See, e.g., BOC Int'l, Ltd. v. F.T.C., 557 F.2d 24, 25-26 (2d Cir. 1977); F.T.C. v. At.
Richfield Co., 549 F.2d 289, 293-94 (4th Cir. 1977); F.T.C. v. Steris Corp. 2015 WL 5657294,
*966 (N.D. Ohio, 2015). The current Merger Guidelines utilized by the Justice Department and
the F.T.C. also seem to leave open the possibility of applying the theory. GUIDELINES, supra note
63, at 3. Section 2.1.4 reads as follows: "The Agencies consider whether the merging firms have
been, or likely will become absent the merger, substantial head-to-head competitors. Such
evidence can be especially relevant for evaluating adverse unilateral effects, which result directly
from the loss of that competition." Id
146. The defense was evidently first established in Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad.
Sys., 441 U.S. I, 20-21 (1979). See also NCAA v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468
U.S. 85, 114, 116 (1984).
147. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 85. See generally Roger D. Blair & Richard E. Romano, Collusive
Monopsony in Theory and Practice: The NCAA, 42 ANTITRUST BULL. 681 (1997); Jeffrey L.
Harrison & Casey C. Harrison, The Law and Economics of the NCAA's Claim to Monopsony
Rights, 54 ANTITRUST BULL. 923 (2009); ARTHUR A. FLEISHER III ET AL., THE NATIONAL
COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION: A STUDY IN CARTEL BEHAVIOR 10, 15, 59 (1992).
148. SeeNCAA,468U.S.at99-101.
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have led to an outcome that is, on balance, procompetitive. 149 That,
however, leads to another question: are there less competitive measures
that would achieve the same outcome? 150 One possible answer is that it
is not necessary and that, having demonstrated that the actions are on
balance procompetitive, the requirements of the rule of reason are
satisfied.1 51 Actually this question has been framed in a variety of ways:
is there a substantially less restrictive alternative?152 Are there any less
restrictive alternatives? 153 Have defendants adopted the least restrictive
alternative? 154 The least restrictive alternative test is particularly
attractive since any other means of achieving the procompetitive outcome
is costly to either producers or purchasers. 155 Although there are
reasonable arguments either way on this matter,' 56 those who reject the
least restrictive alternative standard-whether due to legislation or the
result of judicial conservatism-are arguably part of a culture that does
not seriously consider best, or at least better, outcomes.
157
D. The Lowest Price and the Best Price
Probably one of the most perverse assumptions of current antitrust
economics is that people, subject to search costs constraints,1 58 are
constantly on a quest for the lowest prices. 159 Certainly, as a general
149. Examples of recent cases are In re NCAA I-A Litigation, Walk-On Football Players
Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1148 (W.D. Wash. 2005); Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328, 332-36
(7th Cir. 2012).
150. See Gabriel A. Feldman, The Misuse of the Less Restrictive Alternative Inquiry in Rule
of Reason Analysis, 58 AM. U. LAW REV. 561, 629-30 (2009).
151. Technically, Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004) only requires that
agreements not restrain competition. There is no express requirement that they restrain
competition as little as possible.
152. See O'Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1057, 1074 (9th Cir. 2015).
153. This possibility was raised by the Supreme Court in Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med.
Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 353-55 (1982); see generally Jeffrey L. Harrison, Price Fixing, the
Professions and Ancillary Restraints: Coping with Maricopa County, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 925,
942 [hereinafter Harrison, Price Fixing].
154. See generally Harrison, Price Fixing, supra note 153, at 943-44.
155. One seemingly unresolved issue deals with the costs of the less restrictive alternative.
A less restrictive alternative may be more expensive or mean higher transaction costs that
presumably will be shared between the parties and buyers. This issue arose in the Maricopa
County case. See Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 353-54; see also Harrison &
Mashburn, supra note 135, at 58, 88.
156. This issue is not confined to cases involving sports but can arise in any rule of reason
analysis.
157. These examples do not fit precisely the model of second best solutions. Nevertheless,
they illustrate the myopia that can affect antitrust judges and enforcers.
158. At some point the search costs exceed any possible saving with respect to price and the
rational buyer accepts a higher price while knowing it is possible a lower one is available.
159. See supra text accompanying notes 83-88. In particular it carries with it the assumption
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matter, buyers would like sellers to compete, but there is no evidence that
buyers consistently favor competition and low prices over the welfare of
input suppliers. The low price assumption is flatly wrong when price is
the "product" or low price means a decrease in quality or status-
signaling. 160 This suggests that, in some instances, a proper market
definition includes a consideration of all facets of the product, including
price and "product."
The concept of lower prices is often tied to productive efficiency.
Under any conditions, including monopoly conditions, productive
efficiency can lead to lower prices.161 If one considers the full
implications of the view that people prefer lower prices linked to lower
costs of production, the proposition is untrue on even a common-sense
basis-prices could always be lower. 162 At its extreme, it is a goal only
met by employing the most exploitative input acquisition practices
possible, including violating the law when a cost-benefit analysis
indicates that net costs and prices would still be lower after any punitive
sanction is absorbed. Perhaps more important are the data produced over
the last thirty years, demonstrating the desire for fair prices that allow for
humane treatment in upstream markets and for buyers to have a positive
reaction to relative prices. 163
If the antitrust laws are designed to encourage efficient use of
resources, the fact that there are shadow markets for "price" and
"competition" itself cannot be ignored. For example, a firm using the
most exploitative practices in upstream markets may incur lower costs
and charge lower prices, but there is powerful evidence that consumers
have a strong preference for goods manufactured under what they
perceive to be fair conditions. In effect, the notion that a product exists
independent of the process that created it is demonstrably false. A
comprehensive antitrust policy recognizes there are markets for the
that buyers prefer input suppliers to be exploited to the maximum extent possible.
160. See supra text accompanying notes 83-88. There can be an exception. Presumably
someone buying a status good would prefer to buy it at a lower price as long as they got it at a
lower price is unknown to all others, and others are not similarly favored.
161. Prices are set to sell the quantity of output at which marginal cost and marginal revenue
intersect. Lower input prices mean lower costs of production. This lowers marginal cost meaning
that the profit maximizing level of output is higher. Higher output means lower prices.
162. The text lists a number of day-to-day observations that seem to disprove this "default"
position. See supra text accompanying notes 83-88. More recently, objections have been made to
the harvesting of shrimp under slave-like conditions. See also Oliver Holmes, EU Investigators
to Decide on Thai Fishing Industry Ban Over Slave Labour, GuARDIAN (Jan. 20, 2016),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/j an/21/eu-investigators-to-decide-on-thai-fishing-indus
try-ban-over-slave-labour; Kevin McCoy, Slave-Peeled Shrimp Exported to Major U.S. Stores,
USA TODAY (Dec. 15, 2015), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2015/12/14/slave-
peeled-shrimp-exported-major-us-stores/77279762/.
163. See supra text accompanying notes 88-98.
[Vol. 27
OTHER MA RKETS, OTHER COS7S: MODERNIZING ANTITRUST
competitiveness of input markets as well as for the implications ofprice.
E. Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency
Earlier it was noted that one of the foundations of antitrust economics
is reliance on Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. 164 While a very poor substitute for
experienced welfare, the adjustment is made, in part, because of the
problem of interpersonal comparisons of utility. 165 Although it would be
ideal to abandon the Kaldor-Hicks standard, that is a normative
question. 166 Suppose instead the emphasis were shifted from what
consumers were willing to pay for goods and services before actually
making the purchase to their willingness to pay in hindsight or after
experiencing the purchase. 167 The usual question in the case of demand
asks, "what is the most you would pay for a certain product?" A more
accurate measure of efficiency, even under a Kaldor-Hicks standard, is
this: "[a]fter using the product, what is most you would be willing to
pay?"'168 This is obviously an impossible undertaking, but it might also
be visualized in terms of what a buyer would be willing to pay if he or
she knew how satisfactory the product would turn out to be. Quite
possibly, a process like this is already underway. Many online sellers
provide extensive reviews of prior purchasers. 169 For example, in the case
of clothing, consumers may comment on the quality of the fabric and
manufacture as well as whether a garment runs true to size. In an
admittedly vague way, consumers at the decision level could begin to
operate at the experiential level when making a buying decision. If
competition policy is to be the means to the ends it purports to be, part of
that process must include an emphasis on information about actual
experienced outcomes. In effect, failure to provide extensive consumer
experience information is itself anticompetitive. Although out of the
reach of current antitrust laws, 170 failure to provide this information
164. See supra text accompanying notes 16-18.
165. See Daniel Hausman, The Impossibilites of Interpersonal Utility Comparisons, MIND,
473 (July 1995); Peter J. Hammond, Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility: Why and How They
Are and Should Be Made, in INTERPERSONAL COMPARISONS OF WELL-BEING 200 (Jon Elster &
John E. Roemer eds., 1991).
166. It is normative in that it raises the question of whether the Kaldor-Hicks advances any
morally supportable goal.
167. This is still a form of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency since it is based on willingness to pay as
opposed to actual utility.
168. In a sense, the futuristic approach involves insurmountable transaction costs. Of course,
Marty McFry was able to overcome these costs but it is rare.
169. These rating systems are pervasive. Examples can be found on Amazon.com,
Zappos.com, Walmart.com. In addition interet accessible cites have been created. In effect, they
lower the transaction costs that separate decisional and experienced utility.
170. Concealment by monopolists or by individual firms in competitive contexts are likely
not reachable under current antitrust laws.
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means that notions like consumer welfare and allocative efficiency mean
far less than the investment currently made to achieve them would
suggest. This is an instance in which legislation requiring extensive
publication of consumer feedback would make experienced, as opposed
to decisional, consumer surplus more likely.
Ultimately, if competition and antitrust laws are means to ends and
those ends are not properly defined, the effort is largely wasted. The
proper way to make antitrust policy is to determine in a meaningful way
what makes people better off and then assess the capacity of competition
and antitrust policy to achieve those ends. Today's policies fall well short
of that type of analysis.
